


Homework 3: Mandatory Access Control

Principles of data protection

Lattice of classifications

Note: we have the Biba model, so this is about integrity.
Additionally, we have low-watermark for subjects;
this means that subjects can read down, but doing so **drops their integrity level**.

rules: 1. Subject can write object iff it dominates the object $\lambda(s) \geq \lambda(o)$
2. Subject can read all objects
3. after read, we get $\lambda(s) = \min(\lambda(s), \lambda(o))$



Questions 1.2 & 1.3

2. **Yes**, the colonel can change the number of navy units, since his integrity class dominates that of the number of navy units:
 $(HIGH, \{Navy\}) \geq (MEDIUM, \{Navy\})$. **However, this would decrease the colonel's integrity level to $(MEDIUM, \{Navy\})$. Warning: this red-coloured part is not correct. Only a read decreases the integrity level!**
3. **No**, the colonel cannot change the number of navy units after reading the cost of navy units. Note that the cost of navy units has integrity class $(LOW, \{Navy\})$, which means that, after reading this object, the colonel's integrity class decreases to $(LOW, \{Navy\})$. This makes them unable to write to the number of navy units, which has integrity class $(MEDIUM, \{Navy\})$, and we have $(MEDIUM, \{Navy\}) \geq (LOW, \{Navy\})$.

NEEDS

FIXING

Questions 1.6 & 1.7

6. **Yes**, the captain can compute the cost of overall defence units. Note that reading information does not require belonging to any integrity class **in the Biba model with low-watermark for subjects**, and hence, the necessary information can be read.
7. This question is problematic; while the soldier can read the number of navy units at any time, he cannot write to/modify it, since he only has the LOW integrity level, while writing to the number of navy units requires the MEDIUM integrity level. **Hence, reading the number of navy units after modifying it is not possible (since the modification fails).**

Question 2

- With n security levels and m compartments, we can construct $n \cdot 2^m$ security classes.
- With m compartments, one can construct a (sub)lattice consisting of 2^m classes, since, for every component, a given subject/object is either in that compartment or not, and we can have any combination. This gives 2^m classes due to being equivalent to counting how many bit strings of length m can be made.
- We then multiply this by n levels, since these sub-lattices can essentially be duplicated for every level/put above each other, where the resulting ordering is similar to that in the solution to question 1.1.